We consider a population of agents competing for finite resources by using strategies based on two channels of signals. The model is applicable to financial markets, ecosystems and computer networks. We find that the dynamics of the system is determined by the correlation between the two channels. In particular, occasional mismatches of the signals induce a series of transitions among numerous attractors. Surprisingly, in contrast to the effects of noises on dynamical systems normally resulting in a large number of attractors, the number of attractors due to the mismatched signals remains finite. Both simulations and analyses show that this can be explained by the antipersistent nature of the dynamics. Antipersistence refers to the response of the system to a given signal being opposite to that of the signal's previous occurrence and is a consequence of the competition of agents to make minority decisions. Thus, it is essential for stabilizing the dynamical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Starting from the last decade, physicists have been trying to cope with the issues traditionally approached by economists by using their own tools and methodologies [1] . This research has been dubbed 'econophysics' Since the financial market can be considered as a complex system with a large population, techniques of statistical mechanics are applicable. The Minority Game (MG) is a simple statistical mechanical model for us to study complex economical systems. The minority-winning nature of the MG is close to situations in daily life. For example, in financial markets, all buyers and sellers want to maximize their wealth. Only the minority side gains benefits because of the excess demand or supply of the whole system. This often creates antipersistent behavior, which refers to agents rushing to the minority side as adaptive attempts in the evolving environment, resulting in opposite responses to consecutive occurrences of a given signal [2] .
Decisions of agents in the market are often responses to information relevant to them. However, noisy information may cause confusion in their decision making. Hence, we are interested in studying the effects of noisy signals on the system and the underlying physics. In order to model these features, we introduce a new MG model, "the Minority Game with Errors" with two channels of signals in this paper. * E-mail: eyeshadow.lee@gmail.com; phkywong@ust.hk
II. THE MINORITY GAME WITH ERRORS
This model is based on the original Minority Game [3] . "The Minority Game with Errors" is a binary game in which N (N must be odd) agents have to make binary decisions (denoted by 0 or 1) independently at every time step and the agents making the minority decision win. The decisions of the agents are based on signals. In the original version of MG, the signals are endogenous and consist of winning bits of the most recent M steps. In another version of the game, the signals are exogenous [4] , and are randomly selected from D signals at each step. Studies have shown that the behavior of these two versions are very similar [4] . In this paper, we adopt the exogenous version of the MG. Each agent holds s strategies, which are binary functions mapping the D signals to decision 0 or 1.They adopt the most successful one among the s strategies in order to have a higher chance to win. The success of a strategy is measured by its cumulative payoff (or virtual point), which changes by +1 for a minority decision and -1 for a majority decision. In order to model the errors in signals, we introduce s channels of external nearly identical signals, each feeding the corresponding strategy. For s = 2, we call the signals Exo-1 and Exo-2. In detail, Exo-1 is a randomly generated signal. Exo-2 is the same as Exo-1 in most of the time steps, but differs occasionally, as shown in Fig. 1 Fig. 1 . Illustration of the signal for D = 2, with errors for every τ time steps. Exo-1 is randomly generated. Exo-2 is nearly identical to Exo-1.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We schedule the errors to occur once every τ steps, where τ is a large number compared with the period of dynamics so that agents can have enough time to adapt to changes of the system caused by errors. Fig. 2 shows a simulated time series of attendance, which is defined as the number of agents choosing 1 in a time step. We can observe that attendance clusters only on several values (around 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7) before the occurrence of the first error at t = τ . In the language of non-linear science, there exists an attractor that contributes to the dynamics of the system. After an error occurs, the attendance clusters on another set of values (around 0.4 and 0.6). Hence, a new attractor is formed due to the errors in the input signals. After each occurrence of errors, the pattern of attendance alternates between the two attractor states of the system. Other intervals between errors, as well as other samples, result in two further attractors. Since the error generation mechanism is random, it is surprising that errors result in regular patterns. In contrast, many complex systems, when fed with occasional noisy signals, move among numerous attractors and, therefore, cannot maintain their stability.
From the above results, this system appears to be resistive to huge changes. Then, we may ask the following questions in order to know more about its stability: The detailed analyses in the following sections are essential to answering the above questions.
IV. PHASE SPACE ANALYSIS
In order to understand the dynamics of the system easily, A µ is defined as follows [5, 6] . 
where N µ 1 (t), N µ 0 (t) are, respectively, the number of agents choosing 1 and 0 when the input signal is µ at time t. For simplicity, we consider D = 2 so that µ = 0 or 1. If A µ is positive, the minority side will be 0, and vice versa. Thus, A µ is a useful tool to analyze the dynamics inside the system when it responds to different input signals µ. As there are only A 0 and A 1 , using the two-dimensional phase space is the most suitable way to describe the dynamics [5] .
From the simulation results in Fig. 3(a) , the clustered data points show that the system stays in different attractors between the occurrence of error signals. Each attractor has a polygonal pattern of its own size in phase space.
Since the dimension is not high (D = 2), the dynamics of the system can be studied analytically. For each strategy combination, the number of agents holding it is assumed to be the same if N is large compared with the total number of strategy combinations. Therefore, the attractor states can be calculated by considering the cumulative payoffs of all strategies. The values of these attractor states in different stages are listed in Table 1 .
In Fig. 3(b) , the color lines are the analytical results in Table 1 . Before the first error, the attractor of the system is the blue one. When an error occurs, the attractor transits to the red one with a smaller size. When a further error appears, the system restores back to the original blue attractor with a very high probability and transits to the green one with a low probability. Similarly, transitions to further attractors may continue, but with a lower and lower probability. The transitions of the attractors follow the sequence shown in Table 1 . The pink attractor, the smallest among all, represents the final stage of attractor transitions. An occurrence of an error in the pink attractor cannot cause it to transit further into another attractor. It must restore back to the previous attractor (green) when one more error occurs.
V. PAYOFF SPACE ANALYSIS
In order to study the mechanism of the stoppage of further attractor transitions, one should study the payoff space, whose dimensions are k µ (t), defined as the number of wins minus losses of decision 1 up to time t when the game responded to signal µ. Since a location in the payoff space records the winning history of decision 1, the cumulative payoffs of all strategies can be calculated [5] . For example, the cumulative payoff Ω a (t) of strategy a up to time t can be computed as follow: where σ µ a is the binary decision (0 or 1) of strategy a for signal µ. Thus, the dynamics of the system can be totally determined after knowing the trajectories in the payoff space.
Attractor transitions in the payoff space shown in Figs. 4(a)-(d) are the same as those in phase space using identical colors and sequences. In Fig. 4(a) , the nine points represent the nine states of the blue attractor. When an error occurs in the blue attractor, each state splits into two, due to different signals in Exo-1 and Exo-2. In order to identify the two groups of attractor states in Fig. 4 , we use and to represent the states responding to Exo-1 and Exo-2, respectively. Dotted lines are drawn to show the dynamics and the linkages of the two separated states. After splitting, the nine states of the blue attractor combine to form the four pairs of states of the red attractor in Fig. 4(b) , the states in each pair being separated by a displacement of 1 in both the horizontal and the vertical directions. The states in each pair move in the same direction simultaneously in the payoff space while the signals in Exo-1 and Exo-2 are identical. Similarly, when an error occurs in the red attractor, the four pairs of states may split and combine to form the nine pairs of attractor states of the green attractor in Fig. 4(c) , and the displacements in these new pairs are 2 in both directions. The transition from the green to the pink attractor in Fig. 4(d) can be described similarly. In summary, the attractors are different in the vertical and the horizontal displacements separating the two groups of attractor states. From Fig. 4(b)-(d) , the vertical and the horizontal separations between the two groups of attractor states are constant for each attractor. Moreover, the separations change by 1 when an attractor transition takes place due to the occurrence of an error. Thus, the horizontal and the vertical separations in the blue, red, green, and pink attractors are 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The mechanism of attractor transition is explained in Fig. 5 . Suppose the attractor states responding to Exo-1 and Exo-2 lie on the k 1 and the k 0 axes respectively, and the corresponding input signals are 0 (for Exo-1) and 1 (for Exo-2). In this case, k 0 = 0 among the agents responding to Exo-1. From Eq. (2), all strategies have the same cumulative payoff. Since the strategies are randomly picked, on average, half of the agents in group choose 0, and the remaining half choose 1 to the lower order. A similar argument applies to the agents responding to Exo-2. The winning decision will then be determined by the sample-dependent fluctuations of the strategies to the next order. The minority side is 0 with probability 1/2 so that the locations of the groups and in Fig. 5 both decrease by 1 along the k 0 and the k 1 axes, respectively. Hence, the displacements between these two groups increase by 1, transforming the attractor from red to green.
From the above results, we can deduce that the attractor transitions do not have infinite stages. The final stage is the pink attractor, as shown in Fig. 4(d) . The vertical and the horizontal separations between a pair of states in this attractor are 3. Both the k 0 and the k 1 coordinates of the pair of states alternate between (2, -1) and (1, -2) in the pink attractor, as shown in Fig. 6 and as verified analytically. The physical explanation for this stoppage of further attractor transitions is the intrinsic antipersistent nature of the Minority Game. Antipersistence is the response of the system to a given signal being opposite to that of the signal's previous occurrence [7] . This nature resists consecutive winnings or losings for the same signal, causing the coordinates of the pink attractor states to oscillate between 2 and 1, or -1 and -2, but never reach 0 where transitions to further attractors are possible. Therefore, it limits the number of attractors of this complex system under noisy signals to 4. Thus, antipersistence strengthens the stability of the whole system and avoid large fluctuations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a new variation of the Minority Game, The "Minority Game with Errors" The new feature used two channels of signals to model the effects of errors occurred in the input signals. We found that the noisy signals induce transitions between different attractors, but the number of accessible attractors is limited by antipersistent effects. Hence, antipersistence is able to stabilize dynamical systems, making them robust against noise.
Antipersistence is a generic feature, which can be extended beyond a single model. In financial markets, much irrelevant information or news may bother the decisions of an individual. Nevertheless, the whole system will not be affected by noisy signals easily. Similar to the phenomena that we studied in this model, the antipersistent nature of a system stabilizes the system by restricting the number of stages in attractor transitions. Therefore, systems are prevented from breaking down.
It would be interesting to explore further the manifestation of antipersistence in extensions of present model. For example, we may consider the effects of more complicated errors by using more channels and strategies, the reception of noisy channels with different probabilities for different agents, and the stabilization effects of diversity in the initial references. In summary, the Minority Game with multiple channels is a realistic model for physicists to explore the importance of information or errors to complex systems.
